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deny the insurer the defense of non-performance at the time specified and allow
recovery when proof is submitted. It is to be remembered, as noted before, that in
the majority of jurisdictions recovery is allowed although proof of loss is submitted
after the time specified in the policy.
Sometimes policies contain not only provisions as to the time in which proof
of loss must be submitted, but also stipulate that no action can be brought on the
policy after twelve months from the date of loss.1 4 That is, the policy contains
conditions subsequent as well as precedent. In those jurisdictions which allow re-
covery though proof of loss is filed late, the insurer is adequately protected by this
condition. Representative of this group is Continental Fire Ins. Co. v. Whitaker
& Dillard,15 where the court held that, in any event, the proof would have to be
rendered within ten months since no action could be brought for sixty days after
the proof was submitted and no action on the policy could be brought after twelve
months from the date of loss.
The important thing to note here is that there is a very definite conflict in
decisions regarding these vital clauses requiring notice of proof of loss in fire in-
surance policies. And though the decision of the court in the Moyer case is in
keeping with the previous rulings in that state (rulings with which New York and
California courts are in agreement), it is nonetheless contended by this writer that
a reconsideration of this problem is in order.
Kenneth James Arnold
TORTS: RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LANDOWNER TO THE AIRPLANE OVERHEAD
"Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum ... ."I It was an ancient doctrine
at Common Law that the ownership of land extended to the periphery of the uni-
verse. But today, the rule is that the right to the exclusive possession of land
extends upward only to that point necessary for the full use and enjoyment of the
land and the incidents of its ownership. The balance is regarded as open and
navigable airspace 2-a public highway.3
Legislation and judicial decisions during the last fifty years, while still guar-
anteeing to every property owner the fullest enjoyment of his property, have taken
away a part of the sky for which he had little or no use. Congress, by virtue of the
interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution, 4 has plenary control
over airspace, as well as over navigable streams and interstate commerce on land. 5
The Civil Aeronautics Board was founded upon this power, and the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938 declares:
"There is recognized and declared to exist on behalf of any citizen of the United States,
a public right of freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable airspace
of the United States."
6
14 California fire insurance policy form contains this provision; CALlar. INs. ConE, § 2071.
15 112 Tenn. 151, 79 S.W. 119 (1904).
1 BLACKSTONE, COmmENTAmS 18 (Lewis ed. 1902); KENT, COMMENTARIES 629 (Gould
ed. 1896).
2 Northwest Airlines v. Minn., 322 U.S. 292 (1943); Swetland v. Curtiss Airport Corp.,
55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932) ; Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 SLE.2d 245 (1942);
Thrasher v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
3 U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5 Gardner v. County of Allegheny, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955).
6 Civil Aeronautics Act, 1938, § 3, 49 U.S.C.A. § 403.
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The right of flight being clearly established, the upper strata of the atmosphere
has been turned into a limitless freeway by the growing aviation industry.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether aviation is an ultra-hazardous
activity and subject to the rule of strict liability, or whether the law of negligence
is to be applied. The Restatement of Torts favors the rule of strict liability and
considers aviation a dangerous enterprise.7 On the other hand, with the further
development of the aircraft industry, there has been a trend away from the use of
the strict liability rule, and toward the application of the general rules of negli-
gence.8 However, with the rapid advancement of jet aircraft and supersonic flight,
still in the experimental stage and highly dangerous as compared with the fine
safety record of the more conventional aircraft, it is arguable as to whether the
rule of strict liability or the rule of negligence is best as applied to aircraft.
Suits brought by the victims on the ground against the operators and owners
of aircraft have been numerous. It is an established rule of law that the aircraft
overhead is required to exercise a high degree of care toward the potential victims
below.9
On the other hand, what is the landowner's responsibility to the aircraft over-
head?
This question came up before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Yoffee
v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Company.10
On the afternoon of May 11, 1950, a clear day with visibility unlimited, Morris
B. Levitz, a licensed aviator, was aloft in a single engine airplane. It struck the
defendant power company's transmission line which had been strung across the
Susquehanna River at a point 185 feet above the water. Levitz sustained grave
injuries from which he later died. The administrator of his estate brought an action
against the power company. The Court of Common Pleas entered a non-suit,
asserting that the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant had been negli-
gent, and that the decedent had been guilty of contributory negligence. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the decision of the lower court and
ordered a new trial.
The lower court came to the conclusion that the flight of the decedent was at
such a low altitude that it violated certain federal and state regulations. However,
it was shown that the General Flight Rules of the Civil Air Regulations, promul-
gated by the Federal Civil Aeronautics Board, permit flying below the 500-foot
level under certain circumstances."
There had been evidence that the transmission wires were unpainted. The
practice of the industry at that locale was to paint transmission lines with alumi-
num or other highly visible paint. In this instance, neither the wires nor the trans-
mission towers were visible to the eye from aloft. Furthermore, prior to the litiga-
tion, there had been two incidents in which an aircraft had collided with the wires
7 See RsTATEi NT, ToRTs § 520, comment b (1938).
s Boyd v. Wbite, 128 CalApp.2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954). See also Williams v. U.S., 218
F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955); Chapman v. U.S., 194 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1952); Lobel v. American
Airlines, 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951) ; U.S. v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951) ; D'Anna
v.U.S., 181 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950).
9 Margosian v. U.S. Airlines, 127 F. Supp. 464 (ED.D.Y. 1955) ; Parcell v. U.S., 104 F.
Supp 110 (S.D.W.Va. 1951); Gurard v. Flicker, 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d 678 (1933); Rochester
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y.S. 469 (1933).
10 385 Pa. 520, 123 A.2d 636 (1956).
11 See 14 C.F.R. § 60.17(c) (Supp. 1956).
March, 1957 NOTES
at this particular spot. The defendant had knowledge of these accidents and yet
had made no effort to advise the numerous pilots within the area of this hazard.
Submitted that if the pilot aloft is negligent in the operation of his aircraft
it may cause damage to those below; conversely, is it not possible that the land-
owner might have erected an instrumentality upon his premises which through his
negligence may cause damage to the aircraft above? If this is so, then it follows
that a conflict of interests exist between the right of free flight and the right of the
landowners to the reasonable use of their land.
That everyone must use his property so as not to injure others is an almost
universally recognized principle.12 Generally, no one can acquire a right of the
space above the land that will limit the landowner in its use. Any injurious use of
such space, which constitutes an actual interference with the possession and bene-
ficial use of the land, would be a trespass.13 But the height to which a surface
owner may reasonably expect to occupy airspace for himself, to the exclusion of
others, must be determined upon the particular facts.14
In the principal case, the lower court was of the impression that the defendant
owed the decedent no duty at all and that no liability attached. This is not unlike
Judge Cardozo's opinion in the well known case of Palsgraj v. Long Island R. Co.'5
which held that the injury to the plaintiff was unforeseeable and as such, the de-
fendant owed no duty to the plaintiff in that particular instance. But where the
landowner has knowledge of prior incidents of contact with his instrumentality
and it is foreseeable that there may be future mishaps of the same nature, then
there would appear to be a duty to exercise reasonable care in regard to this fore-
seeable danger.1 6 In the principal case, the defendant had notice of the prior acci-
dents with its wires and consequently the injury to the plaintiff cannot be consid-
ered unforeseeable. That being the case, the defendant should have exercised due
care in the maintenance of his instrumentality.
In addition, the Civil Aeronautics Board has specified that notice should be
given of construction or alteration of structures over 150 feet.17 Therefore, there
is also an affirmative, quasi-statutory duty upon landowners to warn aviators of a
hazard which has been created on the ground.
Where the landowner has created such a hazard, this risk affects the balance
of interests. Although strict liability may be applicable to the aviator, the activity
of the aircraft is no longer a one-sided affair whereby the aviator has the advan-
tages of his actvity and the potential victims below take all the risk of ground
damage. 18 The aircraft is being exposed to a hazard created by the landowner and
there is now a mutuality of risks. Each party is exposing the other to a danger,
and the law of negligence should be applicable to both parties.
An analogy may be drawn from an automobile being driven on a highway in
relation to the owner of the adjacent property. The driver of the automobile has
a duty to exercise due care so as not to injure the property of the landowner. Con-
versely, the landowner must so use his property as not to interfere with the rights
12 Ladner v. Siegel, 293 Pa. 306, 142 A. 272 (1928).
13 Strother v. Pac. Gas & Electric Co., 94 Cal.App.2d 525, 211 P.2d 624 (1949). See also
Hinman v. Pac. Air Trans., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
14 Swetland v. Curtiss Airport, 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).
15 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
16 1Mix v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 389, 18 N.W.2d 130 (1945).
17 See 14 C-F.R. § 625.3(a), 49 U.S.C.A. § 671.
18 See Void, Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings on Ground Victims
Outside of Established Landing Areas, 5 HASTInGs L.J. 1 (1953).
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